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TWICE over the past two months, senior British government figures have met with their Chinese counterparts. The first encounter was Foreign Secretary David Lammy’s meeting with Chinese foreign policy chief Wang Yi in Beijing in October; the second was the talk between Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil in November.
As is usual with high-level diplomatic bilateral meetings, the full transcripts of the discussions have not been disclosed. Aside from initial pleasantries and photo opportunities, the substantial items of these bilateral talks are always private and confidential.
What we can glean from these two meetings for now is set out in the official “readouts” issued by each government. These readouts are usually predictably formulaic. First, each side indulges in diplomatic pleasantries, second, they highlight areas of broad agreement, and then subtly, the readout may mention issues of disagreement. Finally, it often ends with anodyne suggestions along the lines of “We really should catch up more.”
A careful inspection of the readouts of Lammy’s meeting with Wang Yi and the Starmer-Xi Rio talks is helpful for revealing not just what they say but what they don’t.
If we look at Britain’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FDCO) interpretation of the October Lammy meeting, it starts positively enough. It sets out shared aims of “achieving the global green transition” and “promoting secure and resilient growth through increased trade and investment, which creates jobs, drives innovation, boosts productivity and provides economic stability and certainty” for the British economy. They agreed that Britain and China can support both countries” growth objectives.”
Britain’s readout then moves on to obvious areas of difference on the Nato-Russian war in Ukraine and the crises in west Asia (Middle East).
“The Foreign Secretary urged Wang Yi to take all measures to investigate and to prevent Chinese companies from supplying Russia’s military. The Foreign Ministers agreed to continue to discuss this and other broader foreign policy issues, such as the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.”
No mention of preventing Britain from supplying Israel’s military, of course, but no big surprises here.
Then Lammy unwisely turns to China’s internal affairs.
“Human Rights were discussed, including in Xinjiang, and the Foreign Secretary referenced this as an area in which Britain and China must engage, even where viewpoints diverge. Hong Kong is a shared interest, and the Foreign Secretary raised serious concerns around the implementation of the National Security Law and the ongoing treatment of British national Jimmy Lai, again calling for his release.”
How does China’s readout of the same meeting compare? Beijing’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs note largely agrees with the FCDO on the obvious benefits of co-operation rather than conflict.
“The British Labour government has put forward the proposal to develop a long-term, stable and strategically significant relationship with China. The Chinese side has positively evaluated this proposal, as it conforms to the historical logic and practical needs of the bilateral relationship, serves the fundamental interests of the two peoples, and aligns with the historical trend and the international situation.”
But then comes the pushback. First of all, Wang Yi gently reminds Britain’s Foreign Secretary that an MP for Tottenham lecturing China on Chinese soil about Chinese issues is hardly conducive to the “bilateral engagement” that Britain leaders claim to seek.
“Noting that Taiwan and Hong Kong affairs are China’s internal affairs, and non-interference in internal affairs is a fundamental principle of international relations, Wang said both sides should respect each other’s concerns, strengthen dialogue on the basis of equality, enhance understanding, and create an atmosphere for communication and co-operation.
Then the Chinese move in for the second strike, a double-Lammy, if you will.
“Britain remains steadfast in honouring its commitment to the Taiwan question since the establishment of diplomatic relations and will stick to it in the long term, Lammy said.”
Although you wouldn’t know from Britain’s readout, which does not mention Taiwan even once, Wang Yi made Lammy squirm. The British side essentially had to reiterate longstanding British policy, dating back to 1972 in the Heath era, where Lammy’s predecessor as foreign secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, stated to the House of Commons that: “The government of the United Kingdom acknowledge the position of the Chinese government that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China.
“Both the government of the People’s Republic of China and Taipei maintain that Taiwan is a part of China. We held the view both at Cairo and at Potsdam that Taiwan should be restored to China. That view has not changed. We think that the Taiwan question is China’s internal affair to be settled by the Chinese people themselves.”
Naturally, this does not sit well with the increasingly visible and well-funded Taiwan-separatist lobby at Westminster. It shows, of course, that what British leaders tell China is not necessarily what they tell the British people.
Tellingly, Lammy downgraded the Xinjiang question from one of alleged and utterly unproven “genocide,” a pre-election position held by the Parliamentary Labour Party, to the vague but unimpeachable appeal to human rights.
The Downing Street readout on the November 18 Rio summit was terse, just eight paragraphs. This is the key one.
“The Prime Minister said that he also wanted to engage honestly and frankly on those areas where we have different perspectives, including on Hong Kong, human rights and Russia’s war in Ukraine.”
No mention of Xinjiang at all, nor of Israel’s genocide in Gaza, not even Taiwan.
A number of commentators have assumed that the policy shift on Xinjiang is related purely to the Starmer government’s hope to reset economic relations with Beijing, see for example, “Labour backtracks on Uighur ‘genocide’ stance as Lammy heads to China” (Daily Telegraph, October 17). However, given Britain’s continued utilisation of the Hong Kong situation, this is unlikely to be the whole story.
One other explanation is that the Xinjiang genocide propaganda simply hasn’t worked where it was supposed to. The majority Muslim countries of west, central and south-east Asia have, more often than not, expressed guarded support or at least sympathy for China’s view that one key factor in the Xinjiang question is the role of global Islamist extremist networks and terrorist groups.
Uighur terrorists have been apprehended as far afield as Thailand and Indonesia, for example. The recent resurgence of terrorist attacks in Syria’s Aleppo region, which by sheer coincidence synchronised with the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire, involves armed groups drawn from several Turkic-speaking terror groups. These include Chinese Uighur fighters from the Al Qaida-linked Katibat al Ghuraba al Turkistan (KGT).
Or perhaps, just as with the allegations of Tibetan genocide, which notably intensified in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and then gradually dissipated, there is neither the evidence nor continuing credulity to sustain these propaganda projects.
However, there may be yet another rather more obvious reason.
The current and previous British governments stand accused of complicity in a televised, live-streamed genocide, namely the one in Gaza. Starmer’s own rancid apologetics for Israeli war crimes is a matter of public record.
Whether through shame, embarrassment, or guilt, the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have good reason to drop the term genocide from their anti-China rhetoric. It seems Starmer and Lammy, or their advisers, are fully conscious of this absurd and self-incriminating juxtaposition.