THE opening shots for the May general election have been fired and we are in a non-stop countdown to the final day, widely regarded as one of the most important general elections since World War II.

But what is happening to the political discourse and the different narratives each of the main parties is adopting?

If, as believed, it will end in another hung parliament leading to another coalition government, then how can the public distinguish between what is being offered by the different parties?

Unfortunately the strategies adopted by most Establishment parties in developed economies can be predicted in such circumstances.

They are little to do with clarification and honesty and much more to do with confusion.

The tactic adopted by spin doctors and the host of public relations consultants hired to show off each party is the exact opposite of what is required for the public to make informed, rational choices as to how they will vote in May. Certainty is the enemy of spin doctors.

The tactic of confusion and uncertainty as a deliberate election strategy is derived from one of Vladimir Putin’s most trusted advisers.

Vladislav Surkov has helped Putin stay in power for 15 years by adopting an entirely new political lexicon.

The BBC’s Richard Curtis has revealed that Surkov came originally from the avant-garde art world, and those who have studied his career say that what Surkov has done is import ideas from conceptual art into the very heart of politics.

His aim is to undermine people’s perceptions of the world so they never know what is really happening.

Surkov turned Russian politics into a bewildering, constantly changing piece of theatre.

As one journalist put it: “It is a strategy of power that keeps any opposition constantly confused” — a ceaseless shape-shifting that is unstoppable because it is indefinable.

It is exactly what Surkov is alleged to have done in Ukraine last year.

In typical fashion, as the war began, Surkov published a short story about something he called non-linear war — a war where you never know what the enemy is really up to or even who they are.

The underlying aim, Surkov says, is not to win the war but to use the conflict to create a constant state of destabilised perception in order to manage and control.

The US has also been using this tactic. Over the past three decades, the US defence community has shown an increasing interest in learning lessons from the non-linear sciences.

It explains why one minute Saddam Hussein is a friend of the West fighting Iran and being

supplied with arms by the US, and then suddenly he is a despotic enemy to be fought and defeated with overwhelming military strength.

It explains why the US backed the mojahedin and Osama bin Laden against the Soviet intervention Afghanistan, then suddenly changed to identifying the enemy as the Taliban (mojahedin) and assassinating bin Laden.

The result is confusion among the public unable to keep up with changing perceptions and defining who exactly “the enemy” is.

In Britain these tactics can be seen particularly on the election battleground of the NHS.

Not long ago the political narrative was shaped around each party trying to out-bid each other over spending, better services and restructuring in aid of efficiency and effectiveness.

Now the narrative is changing to blaming the public for clogging up hospital beds, inappropriate use of A&E and frivolous use of 999 calls.

Patients are fed stories about the luxury lifestyles and huge pay of GPs and encouraged to use their local doctor instead of hospital A&Es.

Then the story switches to a GP crisis, lack of funding, inability to recruit GPs and failure to offer a seven-day a week service just like Tesco does.

The thread running through this chaotic narrative is the blame game — the idea that a hate figure can be identified, someone to blame.

Greedy GPs, a lazy public, out-of-touch managers — anyone will do for a short while before the story swerves again.

The aim is to sow confusion and create a constant state of destabilised perception among the voting public.

Apparent differences between the main parties will be exaggerated, when in practice there is little real difference.

The “enemy” will be identified (immigrants, ethnic minorities, trade unions) by the right but then carefully fudged by Labour so as not to alienate core voters. Confusion is the order of the day.

Financial forecasts will feature in the news as if a certain prediction of the costs of each party’s promises can be made when real-world economics is far less certain and the future of the global economy cannot be forecast.

The trick is to keep the public off balance, not able to understand the confusion and fog of claim and counter-claim.

It explains why over decades interest in politics and voting has steadily declined to an all-time low. Young voters are especially sceptical or indifferent.

Politicians publicly claim to be concerned about voter apathy, but in truth it is a measure of their strategic success.

It is exactly what they want. They do not want an active public political discourse, they aspire to mediocrity and blandness and simplicities which do not add up.

This maintains their hegemony over ideas and discussion. They set the agenda and nothing else can be entertained. It is the very opposite of an active, informed political electorate engaged with contemporary issues and provided with the tools to analyse them and make decisions based on accurate evidence.