Jamshid Ahmadi: Can you briefly outline the background of the student movement that led to the recent mass uprising in Bangladesh?

Nisar Ahmed: The background to the student movement lies in the quota system of allocating 30 per cent of government jobs to children and grandchildren of freedom fighters of the 1971 national liberation war that established the state of Bangladesh. After 53 years had elapsed, such a scheme did not make any rational sense to the students.

Moreover, in the past 15-year rule of the Awami League and Sheikh Hasina, it was misused to benefit party members and to politicise the state machinery. With acute unemployment among youth following two decades of neoliberal economic policies, it was a ticking bomb waiting to detonate.

What in your view triggered such a mass uprising?

The immediate trigger for the mass upsurge that followed the quota struggle was a speech by the ex-premier, Hasina, on her return from an official visit to China.

In an answer to a question from journalists, she said that the movement around the quota system was being conducted by the children of “razakars” (a derogatory term akin to “quislings”). It has been a hallmark of her response to any opposition to her regime to frame it in terms of a binary divide between those who are the freedom fighters of 1971 and those who are “razakars.”

This offended the sentiments of the students and they came out onto the streets and revolted in their thousands from July 14 onwards. For nearly three weeks, the ruling regime initiated a policy of violent repression using all elements of the state: police, border guard force, and the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) to carry out severe repression. The result was: around 300 killed, over 1,000 injured, and 10,000 arrests. As a result, a student struggle gravitated towards a mass upsurge of the entire people.

What transpired next and how did the mass uprising lead to the fall of the Hasina regime?

The Awami League government, pursuing neoliberal economic policies, was already facing a difficult economic situation reflected in the following: dwindling foreign exchange reserves, near breakdown of the banking system, looting of funds and assets and shifting them abroad, high inflation, and an upward trend in youth employment. Above all, the sheer rigging of national elections in 2014, 2018, and 2024 all coalesced to make the youth movement on quotas a more potent and lethal combination.

However, it was the brutal repression unleashed by the Hasina regime between July 15 and August 4 that sealed her ultimate downfall. She first sent in the police and her heavily armed student wing to create havoc in the country’s educational institutions. They were beaten back.

Then, perhaps in a fit of madness, she sent in the police, the paramilitary force of the border guards, and the RAB to create further mayhem and inflict sheer brutality. Thus, instead of containing the students, she faced a massive popular upsurge as hundreds of thousands of people came out onto the streets to aid the students. There was a single slogan: “One point, one demand: when are you going, Hasina?”

In a desperate last bid, she turned to the national army who refused her order to fire upon the masses. The die was cast and she left the country ignominiously on August 5 after 15 years of rule.

What is the state of play now after the fall of the regime?

On August 5, immediately following her flight to neighbouring India, the chief of staff of the army publicly announced the resignation of Sheikh Hasina and thereby the effective end of Awami League rule. As with such initial moves by the ruling classes, there is of course ample cause for uncertainty, apprehension, as well as an element of hope.

The first task of the army is to dampen the protests on the ground and then to get the crowds of students and the general public off the street. This signals the emergence of a familiar script from 1990 when the military dictator General Ershad was ousted — and again in 2006, when the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) regime was removed.

Now it is the turn of the Awami League. The army is asking President Mohammad Shahabuddin, as the constitutional head of state, on the basis of discussions with the army, student leaders, selected political parties, individuals from the civil society, business persons etc, to quickly agree on the formation of an interim government to carry on the general task of governance and slowly achieve the consensus on a road map for a general election in which all can participate.

This happened in 1990 and 2006 and initial developments seem to be to this end. This would essentially be a “caretaker” government in Bangladesh. However, there might be challenges to this set-up from a number of directions. Firstly, the student leaders and their representatives might not agree on the modus operandi of the interim government or its composition.

Secondly, various internal and external forces will try to undermine the peace through communal attacks, revenge-taking, as well as mindless destruction of life and property. Thirdly, the economy is in a very fluid state and various sections expect immediate relief. If that does not ensue then different social, economic, and political demands might surface and come to the fore.

How will the situation likely evolve over the medium term and how are left and progressive forces assessing the situation?

From an analytical viewpoint, what has taken place is not a total crisis for the ruling classes in Bangladesh. In fact, the army’s intervention was to prevent such a crisis from occurring. However, what we do see is a total crisis for the Awami League.

The other sections of the ruling classes: the army, bureaucracy, political representatives of forces such as the BNP, capitalist classes, etc, remain intact. The situation could descend into a total crisis if the army is challenged on the streets, the economic situation collapses, the workers and peasants engage in protests to increase pay and bargaining power, or external forces intervene to arrest a deteriorating law and order situation. However, I personally doubt that this will happen.

The left and the progressives are divided in their approach to the emerging political scenario in Bangladesh. A section buys into the Awami League narrative that it is a struggle between Islamic fundamentalism and secularism.

They have hardly participated in the student struggle and are perceived to be on the side of the Awami League. Another section thinks that the primary struggle is for democracy and that there should be some sort of united front of all political parties, including the BNP.

They are perceived to be allies of the BNP. What has not emerged, in any major or influential sense, is an independent left narrative that goes beyond the binary one of democracy and secularism.
 

What lessons does the mass uprising and the ongoing struggle for power in Bangladesh have for the left and progressives in other parts of the world?

At a global level, we see a common trend of mass uprisings breaking out as an effect of the financial crisis that erupted in 2007. In country after country in the post-colonial world, we see a combined crisis at the economic and political level.

At the economic level, it is the primitive accumulation and the immense inequality that has been created from the unfettered pursuit of globalised neoliberal capitalism under the aegis of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO.

At the political level, there is a crisis of governance and accountability that is giving rise to undemocratic, authoritarian, and fascist governments as well as the rise of populist and jingoistic regimes.

Thus, in Bangladesh, we saw the Awami League regime conduct the blatant rigging of three national elections. Will others fare better? Within the mainstream political parties, we see the pursuit of aggressive nationalisms under different guises: the Awami League (nationalism based on ethnicity), BNP (nationalism based on country), and Jamaat (nationalism based on religion).

Whatever their notional differences on nationalism, they are united by their common pursuit of neoliberal economic policies.

All these are not unique to Bangladesh. We see them replicated in the Arab Spring as well as movements in Latin America, Africa, and in other parts of South Asia.

The left and communist parties and the progressive movements need to develop a political strategy to unite the working majority under a banner of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism. We need to overcome the issue of identity-based politics and create a class-based multifarious movement for a more democratic and peaceful world.

This is an edited version of an interview which appeared on Liberationorg.co.uk.