BEFORE I deal with the demise of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) it makes sense to remind ourselves of the circumstances of its birth.

The conclusion of the second world war was sealed at Potsdam between the Soviet Union, the US and Britain.

France was later included and from then on the future development of Germany was dependent on the four allied powers that had defeated fascism.

A new order was created in Europe which led first to the division of Germany and then, with the onset of the cold war in 1946, the division of Europe.

The first steps in this process were always taken by the Western powers with the East responding.

The Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949, followed shortly afterwards by the GDR.

Nato was followed by the Warsaw Pact, the European Community (EC) by the Council for Mutual Economic Co-operation (Comecon).

This sequence of events seemed to be automatic. The contradictions grew and the two German states gave this historical process a special character.

When the GDR was founded on October 7 1949, the Soviet Union spoke of a turning point in European history. However one views the process that followed, this description represented the reality of the time.

Germany was divided into two states and both had their special place in their respective spheres.

The restricted rights laid down by the victorious powers in both East and West were reflected in the development of their very different social systems. This was the case, in essence, right up until the end of the GDR.

The starting points for both states were also radically different. The Soviet zone of occupation which became the GDR was obliged to pay 97 per cent of the designated war reparations to the Soviet Union — an amount of more than 100 billion German marks.

In 1990 the renowned Bremen University social scientist Professor Peters calculated that this sum with interest represented over 700bn marks.

The Federal Republic, on the other hand, received Marshall Aid from the US which gave its economy a vital innovatory boost, and the giant German industrial companies, which according to the Potsdam Agreement should have been broken up, were soon granted access to world markets.

Even if the political systems of so-called “actually existing socialism” went under before the final demise of the Soviet Union, the end of the GDR and the way it was destroyed cannot be separated from the demise of the Soviet Union and its loss of significance in the international arena.

The key questions at the centre of all the differences that existed between the two German states were the property relations concerning land and factory ownership.

These relations had been created by the Soviet military administration. They were then developed further and strengthened by the GDR.

The political power structures and relationships at that time permitted little flexibility in terms of change or reform. The brakes were applied on any attempt at creating economic structures at variance with the Soviet model and in the end such efforts had no chance.
This is what happened to the attempt to introduce the New Economic System of Planning and Management in the 1960s.

The GDR’s social achievements in the areas of healthcare and education, gender equality and in terms of social relations within the workplaces reflected a far more egalitarian state of affairs than in the Federal Republic.

Still today, when talking about their struggles for better pay and conditions, trade unionists describe the GDR as having been an invisible partner during negotiations.

But problems grew from generation to generation due to state paternalism, which was particularly evident in information and media policies, the lack of freedom to travel and a growing alienation towards the leading role of the party, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands.

This alienation increased even within the party itself, with regard to the leadership.

A significant expression of political weakness was reflected in the tension between the continued announcements in the media of national achievements and people’s experience in their daily lives and in their workplaces, together with all the restrictions on democratic expression.

The autumn of 1989 was characterised by demonstrations and the chants of “We are the People!” together with demands for a democratic transformation of the GDR.

Alongside the growing numbers attempting to leave the GDR, one could hear chants of “We’re staying here!” which was connected with the demands being made for democratic change.

The state and party leadership reacted at first with a show of force, then helplessness.

One thing was abundantly clear — large sections of the population wanted change within the GDR.

However, with the increasing influence coming from outside the GDR towards the close of 1989, the main chant was changed to “We are one people!”

The role of the state security forces (Stasi) was whipped up to a frenzy of hatred, which increased the likelihood of violent confrontation.

With the setting up of a Government of National Responsibility on February 4 1990, a relative stability was temporarily secured.

After hard and dogged discussions the oppositional groupings declared their willingness to delegate ministers without portfolio to the government.

With the new parliamentary elections scheduled for March 18 1990, the situation changed fundamentally.

On February 7 chancellor Helmut Kohl, ignoring the advice of his economic advisers, called for the introduction of the West German mark in the territory of the GDR, replacing its own currency.

With this he virtually guaranteed the electoral victory of the “Alliance for Germany” — a loose coalition of conservative and pro-united Germany forces — which was calling for the rapid unification of the two states.

After the meeting in Malta between Mikhail Gorbachov and George Bush on December 2-3 1989, the US saw its chance and took the initiative for subsequent steps.

At this moment and for this role Kohl was the ideal chancellor for the Federal Republic — he had already developed cordial and trusting relations with Gorbachov.

However, as we know today — from Kohl’s controversial reminiscences — in Kohl’s eyes Gorbachov had already failed and was becoming increasingly isolated.

Kohl also denies the fact that “the revolutionaries in the East were chiefly responsible for the downfall of the regime in the East.”

He said that it was risible to believe that “the Holy Ghost had suddenly descended onto Leipzig’s town squares and changed the world,” referring to the fact that the church played a prominent role in the popular uprising.

In this Kohl is certainly right. The reasons for the failure and the eventual collapse of the attempts to build socialism in eastern Europe lie deeper and are not unconnected with the economic debility of the Soviet Union.

But what “assistance” was given by the West in the background in this undertaking has still not been really examined.

Hans Modrow was the last prime minister of the German Democratic Republic. He is currently the honorary chairman of the Left Party (Die Linke).
The second of this three-part feature series will appear in Monday’s paper.